Inagaki / Sikkema

Enlightenment rationality on which Western ethics has been based has faded away. Over against this rationality, a fragmented, postmodern, nonrational relativism has become popular today. Neither extreme is acceptable to us. The origin of these extremes lies in the simplicity of the concept of enlightenment rationality; however, real human society is not simple. By taking into consideration the true complexity of society, we can develop an ethics that is normative but not fragmented. In recent years, natural scientists have been formulating the science of complex systems, in which simple rationality - in the sense that we can predict the exact behavior of a system - is no longer valid. One aspect of the complexity of the natural world is seen in the ubiquity of the phenomenon of emergence, which leads to an understanding of the world as being stratified in structure and meaning. In physics, many nonlinear systems exhibit pattern formation and phase transitions; in biology, living things are composed of non-living molecules; in psychology, the mind is intimately connected with, though not explicable in terms of, brain matter. Emergence in the natural world can give new insights in the search for reality, insights not inferred from the concept of enlightenment rationality. It suggests that each stratum in reality will have its own peculiar method of investigation and its own causality. Intermediate in the structure of reality from nature to human society, the human person represents a unique example of emergence. This stratified structure of reality is a reasonable view, given contemporary natural science, quite different from the view of postmodern relativism. It exhibits a normative structure in nature and society that cannot be reduced from higher to lower parts. From the bottom up, let us denote this stratified world as worlds 1 (natural), 2 (mental), 3 (social), and 4 (spiritual). Especially the human person should not be seen as only body and mind (worlds 1 and 2), but also social and spiritual (worlds 3 and 4) at the same time. Now ethics in this approach can be developed in a normative but not fragmented way. It should be noticed that the idea of emergence comes from natural science (objectively), but a person can find meaning and act in the stratified world in an intentional way or a hermeneutical way (subjectively). The Dooyeweerdian view will be compared with this realistic approach.

Henk Stoker

The postmodern era, where many people reject absolute truths except those that one decides for oneself to be correct and true, is averse to anything that could be regarded as religious rigidity. This is incited by a fear of the fanaticism that marks many religious movements throughout the ages - including the present. It is a modern cliché that some of the worst injustices in history were committed in the name of religion. We know that in the name of various religions the most horrible deeds are committed even to this day. The problem is that all that has just been said, may also be examined from other ethical angles. The postmodern maxim of deciding for oneself what is correct and true, may from another angle be regarded as human pride. Religious rigidity may be interpreted as devoted obedience to God or gods. Fanaticism may in some groups be regarded as self-sacrificing love for one's god or religion. Some of the worst injustices ever committed may be regarded by the followers of certain movements as affirmative action and divine vengeance. The informed (or knowledge-drenched) person is flooded by various religio-philosophical views of the world - each with its own powers of persuasion - all the time and in many different ways. This causes many people to discard the postmodern spirit of the age and to fasten upon interpretations of the world that see everything as black or white, right or wrong. The result is that opinions that challenge or oppose such normative concepts, are regarded with such suspicion that many people are unable to evaluate or respond to things in a rational, logical way. People are then thoroughly convinced of their moral high ground, while they do things that are regarded by most other ethical systems as highly unethical. The problem is usually that these people refuse to be or cannot be open for persuasion. Their own power of judgement and consideration of their opinions have been replaced by manipulation and control by other people. Extreme examples of this situation are cult leaders who kill their own followers (as happened in Uganda), who let their followers commit suicide in large numbers (as happened in among others the USA and Switzerland), and religious leaders who encourage their followers to become assassins in the form of aeroplane hijackers and suicide bombers (as happened in among others the USA and Middle-East). Human rights charters are regarded by many as the answer to the variety of norms and normlessness that rule today. Ironically such human rights acts specifically provide for self-made norms and normlessness. By the creation and statement of fundamental rights that are purported to be an unassailable part of humanity, an attempt is made to create a basis from which issues may be ruled and judged normatively. Since tolerance and freedom of speech usually form an integral part of such acts, these documents create (against their own intention) opportunities for extremism and "unethical" religious movements to flourish (at the expense of the very people that the document intended to serve). The only profound answer to ethically confused and dualistic people of today, is to bring them to their Creator and thereby to the deepest reason for their specific existence. Since emotions play a vital role in ethical convictions - also and especially in "unethical" religious groups - the heart of the people must be reached. The time has come for basic Christian ethical principles to be marketed in effective ways - especially in a Biblically unethical religious world. These principles will have to include such concepts as freedom, virtue, duty, responsibility, response, vocation, motive, motivation, purpose, method, consequence, treatment and management of people; as well as man's relationship with God, neighbour, nature and culture. How this can be communicated to people in "unethical" religious movements who have their own sets of norms and views of reality, creates unique problems and opportunities.

Hans-Martien Ten Napel

According to the Human Development Report 2004, '[c]ultural liberty is a vital part of human development because being able to choose one's identity - who one is - without losing the respect of others or being excluded from other choices is important in leading a full life'. The Report therefore makes a case for building multicultural democracies by adopting policies on political participation, religion, access to justice, language and access to socio-economic opportunities, that explicitly recognize cultural differences. In my paper I will first of all examine what these policies would imply for the European Union in general and the Netherlands in particular. Secondly, I will evaluate the argument that a multicultural policy approach is both desirable and necessary from a Christian philosophical point of view. According to the Position Paper for this conference, '[i]n Western societies there has been in the past decennia a powerful individualization of morals, often allied with a libertarian-nihilistic or multi-cultural ethos'. Does the notion of a multicultural ethos, which is required to build multicultural democracies, indeed have to be approached critically or is there a link with contributions from the circle of Reformational philosophy to the debate of 'public justice'?

Ralph Vunderink

In the tug of war between the concepts of love, power, and justice, philosophers, ethicists, and business people have taken sides. Many have opted for only one of the three virtues, at the expense of the other two. Nietzsche, in his later years, and Foucault, for instance, have opted for power, Marcel and Buber for love, and others, especially arbitrators of disputes, for justice. But can these three concepts really be considered in isolation, as the above-mentioned individuals affirm. Is there no relationship between them? Reinhold Niebuhr ties power to justice and mutually love (though not to agapic love). In his Love, Power, and Justice, Paul Tillich links the three concepts even more, grounding these no less in God himself. And Herman Dooyeweerd, if I understand him on this point, sees, within the ethical modality of love, analogical, anticipatory moments from all the other modalities, including power (the historical-cultural modality) and justice (the juridical modality). From within the Christian ground motive of creation, fall, and redemption, I like to believe we can get a solution for our tug of war, by looking at the the final moments of the life of our Savior who surrendered his earthly life on "Good Friday." He showed his great love for sinners by giving his life up for them. At the same time, Christ satisfied God's wrath against sin. And on Sunday morning he showed incontrovertible proof that he was stronger than any power, even that of death and hades. While not all theologians have integrated these three moments of Christ's atonement--Anselm clarified the satisfaction theory, Abelard espousd the love theory, and some of the early Fathers pictured the victory theory (at times crudily!)--Calvin was sensitive to a number of strands in the doctrine of Christ's atonement. Within this Christian perspective, I like to select two examples in which love, power, and justice work together. In my own short life as a caregiver in a group home of disabled individuals, I have experienced the tension between justice and power, between what I considered fairness for the residents and what the powers-to-be deemed appropriate action. Because I lacked political clout, I had to leave decisions the way they were. Only after I had retired from the company did I discover that power can encourage the implementation of justice based on love. In one case, my new supervisor made it impossible for me to take a resident to his mother up-north. Because I occupied the low-ranking position of caregiver, I lacked the power to go against my supervisor's plan. After I had severed the ties with the company, I was able to secure the power needed to have the person see his mother. And because I acted out of love for a just cause, power was easily and effectively applied. The disabled individual saw his mother, witout any opposition from the supervisor. In a second, but unrelated case, I was not able to resolve the issue of stand-by guardianship for a resident in another group home. The case manager wanted one of the administration of the company to be that person. Because I felt that that decision would not be completely just to the resident, but favor the administration in case of a serious accident, I disagreed. As long as I worked within the company confines, however, I could not get my way. After I had left, I secured help, and through an unexpected change received the power to have my view accepted. Again, I needed and received the necessary power to implement love on the basis of justice. I submit: where love, power, and justice meet, proper decisions can be made on the personal level. I like to believe that the same three virtues in interdependence can make a dent in difficult social relations (e.g., arbitrations in labor disputes), as I hope to demonstrate in a few examples in the final section of my presentation.

Bennie van der Walt

Not only mutual intercultural enrichment but also intercultural misunderstanding, frustration and even conflict is a daily reality in the ten year old "new" South Africa. Thus it is important not merely to acknowledge that these two cultures are different, but of even greater importance to understand why they differ. This paper deals with a model taking two types of conscience as a starting point of analysis. A good conscience according to the West requires justice (obedience to norms), while a bad conscience is the result of guilt (transgression of norms). Guilt requires reparation and retribution. By contrast, a good conscience in Africa is the result of honour and acceptance by one's community as a result of one's compliance with its ideals. A bad conscience results from one's failure to comply with one's responsibility towards your fellowmen. In such case the offender experiences shame - the consequence of exclusion and rejection. Reconciliation and re-inclusion in society is of utmost importance. Because the aim of this paper is to provide both theoretical insight as well as practical guidance, it starts with a number of practical problems experienced in everyday life in the encounter between African and Western culture. This is followed by a brief overview of seven existing models describing the differences between the two cultures. Subsequently the typology of "shame versus guilt" is described and evaluated in the light of Scripture. The concluding section is an effort to solve, in the light of this new approach to the two cultures, the practical, day-to-day problems mentioned at the beginning.

thursday 18-08-2005   14:00-15:30

Hans Burger

Like non-Christians, Christians experience the consequences of the Post-Modern situation. One of the characteristics of this situation is a nihilistic, disengaged subject which has lost contact with its moral sources. Consequently, for Christian ethics also reflection on the moral sources of the self is important. Charles Taylor shows in his Sources of the Self that the self has to live within a moral framework, a moral space. He mentions four interconnected terms: 'not only (a) our notions of the good, (b) our understanding of self, but also (c) the kinds of narrative in which we make sense of our lives, and (d) conceptions of society, i.e., conceptions of what it is to be a human agent among human agents' (105). The articulation of the moral framework of the self may take the form of ontology. The thesis of this paper is, that the notion of 'being in Christ' is essential in a Christian perspective on this problem. In a Neo-Calvinist perspective, often an appeal has been made to notions like law, creation order or normative structures. However, this does not solve several problems: a. the moral subject itself has become a problem; b. the subject has lost contact with moral notions like law, creation and structures; and c. the subject is often not able to deal with the tension between high moral standards and its own incapability to live in accordance with these norms. Consequently, we need soteriological concepts apart from these normative concepts. We do not only need the law, but also the gospel. The notion of 'being in Christ' indicates a person, a place where these problems can be solved if the moral subject itself is saved. The New Testament offers two models of 'being in Christ': the Johannine model of reciprocal inhabitation, and the Pauline model of participation in the story of Jesus Christ. These models will be reconstructed. Further it will be shown that these models are compatible. In a final systematic elaboration a concept of 'being in Christ' will be developed, to show that this concept gives a good entrance to reflection on the self and its moral sources. First, the concept indicates how the problems listed above can be solved. Second, with the concept of 'being in Christ' a moral framework can be sketched, consisting in the four interconnected terms mentioned by Taylor.

Harry Cook

The theory of natural selection and a naturalistic view of nature, many historians of biology suggest, are the two pillars that support Charles Darwin’s view of nature. Darwin saw the processes of nature as operating without God’s influence and he agonized over the cruelty of nature. These were significant factors in the loss of his traditional Christian faith. The more his theory of evolution was able to explain, the less room he saw for God to have a role. In Psalm 104 King David presents a different view of nature. He professes that all the processes of nature, whether we understand them or not, are controlled by Yahweh. The problem of God’s decreasing power in light of our increasing knowledge is also present, I suggest, in the Intelligent Design movement. It has been criticized for a latent dualism that attributes design in natural phenomena to those things that science cannot explain and a lack of design to the processes and structures that science can explain. A recent book by Del Ratzsch, which suggests that design in biological organisms may be compatible with natural processes, may provide valuable input. Some thinkers have suggested that the uncertainty of quantum mechanics in modern physics provides a window for God’s acting in the world. These viewpoints all deal with an important topic: How does God relate to and interact with this world? The Christian belief of providence has stressed God’s involvement in the events of nature and of this world. Our discussion will examine how Christian thinkers differ in the way they apply this to their disciplines and to their view of the world. A recent paper by Uko Zylstra has raised some penetrating questions about Intelligent Design and God’s interaction with this world. His views are based Dooyeweerd’s theory of levels of organization and laws to correspond with these levels. This paper supports the view that design, and God’s interaction with reality, is present at all organizational levels, in processes that we do and do not understand.

Rudi Hayward

Reformational philosophy has two main ways it can approach ethics. The first is through a philosophical analysis of the ethical mode paving the way for a special science of ethics. The second is to see ethics as concerned with the dual directions of good and evil, this second approach would include at least all of the later (normative) modes within its range. This double approach is also applicable to other sub-disciplines of philosophy, in particular that of epistemology. The following presentation will explore the latter approach and draw out connections with reformational epistemology. In particular Dooyeweerd's distinction between naïve experience and theoretical thought will be explored in relation to the possibility of a normative analysis of the practices of acting persons in the context of human society. Dooyeweerd's distinction between pre-theoretical naïve experience and theoretical thought will be interrogated through a discussion of three critical questions. 1. Does the distinction as it stands gives too much privilege to theory as a differentiated practice; 2. Does the distinction take into account the multi-modal actuality of both everyday experience and theoretical thought; and 3. Does the distinction adequately account for the reciprocity between naïve experience and theoretical thought? These questions will raise the further possibility that naïve experience is not so naïve and is more historical than previously thought. A modified defence of Dooyeweerd against these charges will be given in summary. This will involve showing the importance of the place the transcendental critique had in Dooyeweerd's philosophy and why this had to confront theoretical thought first. Secondly, key themes in Dooyeweerd's treatment of naive experience can be maintained and used productively. Finally Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres has always complemented his transcendental critique and can further enrich and develop the legacy of his reformational project. Drawing on the results of the above analysis the proposal will be made that the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical is replaced with a broader distinction between everyday activities and differentiated practices. This second distinction will include, amongst others, the earlier distinction between naïve experience and theoretical thought and will be provisionally worked out in terms of the conference theme of "persons, practices and society". The continuing relevance of Dooyeweerd's thought will be pointed out in the form some reflections on "normative critique". A plea will be made for a continuing reformation of philosophy in the tradition of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and the importance of thinking through the systematic consequences of new proposals.

Michael Heyns

In this paper I shall react to the impression that current moral visions (mainly versions of naturalism) are not able to affirm a moral order and engage it with the human self because they believe that all universal claims about our moral lives are mere fiction given to us by human culture. It is important to notice that some doubt lingers in the minds of some naturalists whether there is indeed nothing universal about morality. Because of this lingering universality, one cannot simply start to hew all signs of universality like naturalists do. I shall therefore rather go the hermeneutic way and try to articulate and reconsider the supposedly suspect idea of an order of universal moral principles. I will focus on ideas of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. Although he does not stress the divine source for and revelation of a moral order, his diagnosis is still important from a Christian perspective since it draws our attention to tendencies in modern culture that stifles the universal side of morality. He points for instance to the postmodernist perspective according to which the current moral condition is one of a radical pluralistic and thus fragmented content. This fragmentation makes, according to pluralists, a purely subjective choice / creation (and thus non-universal vision) of the moral order almost inevitable. Taylor agrees that the moral horizon has a plural character and that we should pursue this plurality even if it means a conflict between goods. But, he argues, conflict is better than the suppression of moral ideals precisely because of the universal value of these ideals. Taylor sets himself mainly against what he calls proceduralism. Proceduralists, according to his analysis, ignore large parts of moral substance and concentrate only on the rational procedures for making moral decisions. This makes modern ethics a projection of the self that disengages from the extra-self moral order. As alternative Taylor proposes a moral infrastructure that exists of a strong evaluator that connects with the moral order. The moral choices of strong evaluators are dependent on the 'pull' or importance they experience from the content of this moral order. In his attempt to formulate the connection between the self and the moral order, Taylor uses an expressivist notion of an inner resonance of extra-self sources. In dealing with these ideas of Taylor on the nature of universality in morality I will try to develop three theses about his moral thinking I shall indicate, firstly, that his critique of and alternative for the current denial of universality inadvertently but justifiably uses the idea of a "transcendental" order for morality. I will thus also explore what this transcendentalness (which should be distinguished from transcendency) implies and should imply. I shall, secondly, argue that Taylor does not give enough attention to an unequivocal articulation of the transcendentalness of the moral order and that precisely this lack can cause the articulation of the moral order to go astray - although such derailment is not necessarily the case with Taylor. I shall point out, in the third place, that the transcendental side of the moral order contributes in a crucial way to our engagement with this order. Here too I will argue that this is a neglected perspective in Taylor's thinking that can be ascribed to his emphasis on the role of the human ability to articulate in the process of engagement.

Yasunori Ichikawa

Four decades passed since Lynn White’s provocative statement that the spiritual root of the contemporary environmental crises lies in the Judeo-Christian doctrine of God’s entrustment to human beings of the dominion over the creation. There appeared a number of arguments, the pros and cons, on the statement. However, does Christianity with such doctrines as a human being as God’s image and God’s cultural mandate really lead to an environmental destruction? Or, conversely, do non- (or anti-) Christian religions truly have a positive perspective on the relationships among men, nature, and God/gods? Isn’t Japan, for instance, which is a non-Christian society suffering from environmental hazards, today? Can Japanese religious tradition truly provide people with any positive view of man and nature for ethically responsible management of environment? Although it is not easy to identify precisely the Japanese religion, it is generally recognized that Shintoism is the most basic stratum of Japanese religiosity. All foreign religions have been “Japanized” in the process of the mutual adatation with indigenous religious beliefs. In the thought world of pantheistic Shintoism, gods, men, and nature are viewed as existing continuously without a clear demarcation among themselves. In the earliest stage of history, gods were understood as uncontrollable, formidable natural forces, easily identified with, or projected into, wild animals or natural disastrous phenomena. As time went on, gods came to be understood as more humane, which resulted in identifying gods with human heroes, politically authoritative persons, men of religious charismata. Then, gods were classified into the “terrible” and the “gentle” gods. Such an understanding of gods easily leads to arbitrary classification of human beings into the respectable and the unrespectable. The former is thought to have more divinity, and the latter less or no divinity. Since a god is not a definitely personal being who is transcendent of all the other kinds of being, he cannot reveal his will toward human beings in a specifically spoken or written form, which really means that human beings do not have a solid or stable source and criterion of ethical judgment and behavior. How they may know a divine will is via fortune telling, for instance. Or, at most, individuals feel right and safe in their ethics, as long as they conform themselves to the community which is ruled by particular authority who is regarded as sacred. Nature is not understood as in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Since it is not God’s creation, it cannot be viewed as a whole. Since there are many gods, they deal with nature, dividing it into parts - sea, mountain, commerce, house, learning, etc - for their respective treatment of them. Although it is frequently said that Japanese people have been in line with nature, regarding themselves a part of nature in opposition to the Western people who place themselves above nature as God’s image, it is always fragmentalized nature that they think they are part of. It is not nature in its whole. This has something to do with the fact natural science did not develop in Japan influenced until late 19th century when Japan began to have contact with the Western countries. If there is not a positive, specific understanding of the true relations among nature, men, and God with right conception of each, there is no true or profitable perspective for environment and ethics pertaining to it.

John Kok

Contemporary ideas about human responsibility for the environment vary greatly. In this paper I will focus on (1) some of the controversies raging within the field of environmental ethics and (2) some parameters for a Christian response to these controversies. Although “environmental ethics” means many things to different people, most of the participants in this new academic field agree on one fundamental assumption, namely, that there is no right or wrong in nature. Nature is natural, and that is a fact. Nature, in this sense, is “neutral,” subject as it is to natural law. Consensus has it that ethical norms and the values they generate are human constructs. Whether these norms are said to have been derived from a deity, to have evolved from experience, or deduced by logic, the predominant view claims that morals exist only in the human mind. It is humans who determine and define ethical eligibility and, in a sense, dispense rights. Closely related to this sharp distinction between facts and values is the assumption that morals are nothing less (or more) than subjective, self-imposed restraints on people’s freedom of action. Controversy has arisen as to whether environmental ethics, human morality with respect to the nonhuman world, should be motivated by human self-interest, or whether “nature,” which itself cannot demand rights, should be considered as possessing interests or value that people ought to respect, even at a personal sacrifice. I will briefly review both of these conflicting motives (e.g., enlightened anthropocentrism; bio or eco-centric environmental ethics; ecological egalitarianism). Within both the anthropocentric and bio-centric positions, a similar problem arises: Who/what is eligible for moral rights? What is to be included in humankind’s moral community? Everything? If not everything, then where does one draw the moral boundary? With medically nondependent human beings, with (domestic) animals, or does the circle include all living organisms? Or is there reason to include as well rocks, soil, water, air, and the biophysical components that constitute ecosystems? Does the planet itself have rights, possibly even surpassing those of human beings? How do you determine what sorts of things possess rights? The controversies I review are taking place largely within a secular arena that assumes the validity of a fact/value dichotomy in which morals are seen as self imposed restraints on people’s freedom of action. It seems to me that a convincing and viable Christian alternative will (negatively) show that this dichotomy rests upon a questionable foundation as well as expose the fiction of human autonomy, that morality consists of self imposed standards. Before the face of God, given the reality of sin in addition to our status as creatures, any acclaimed right to life, liberty, or happiness, is presumptuous. But a Christian response will also have to articulate (positively) what our life, liberty, and happiness in Christ, Creator and Redeemer, means for our stewardship of the land. God’s covenant, sealed in the second Adam, is after all, also with the earth. This inner reformation of contemporary environmental ethics is no small task, for it demands that we both oppose the idolatry and articulate an obedient and convincing antidote for its extremes. This paper will bring my attempts to articulate this Reformed alternative one more step along. It will build of two earlier publications of mine: “Contemporary Environmental Ethics: A Tempest in a Teapot,” 22 Pro Rege (March 1994) 8-14, and “Affinity, Dominion, and the Poverty of Our Day: Calling and task of agriculture in a world that belongs to God,” in Biblical Holism and Agriculture: Cultivating our roots, edited by D. Evans, R. Vos, and K. Wright (William Carey Library: Pasadena, CA, 2003) 123-138.

Ananka Loubser

The material of this study includes literature on the historically bound nature of the ideographical nature vs. culture polarity. From this material, general concepts of “nature” and “culture” are formed on the basis of value in the context of environmental management. Then, the existence of a polar dualism (nature vs. culture) is indicated via a transcendental critique of the worldview underlying the construction of this relationship. It is shown that the polarity is asymmetrical, causing a hierarchical organization with inherently unsustainable practical consequences in the Western ontology. The nature/culture hierarchical polarity is subjected to a less radical deconstruction and a non-dualistic, less reductionist conception of “nature” and “culture” formulated. The hypothesis of this study is that most current forms of environmental management are based on movements which are trapped in the “nature” vs. “culture” dialectic and that in some influential cases it takes a capitalist (technicist) form. Although some movements recognize the existence of a dualism, they follow “substitution techniques” to dissolve the tension and fail as a result. With “substitution techniques” I refer to those techniques that exchange one of the oppositions with another concept. An example of this can be found in Dooyeweerd (“nature” vs. “freedom”). A solution lies in a mindset which regards the idea of enmity between mankind and “nature” (and resulting idea of “mastery”) as superfluous. The human being is a part/ product of “nature”. And although we use “nature” to create “culture”, we can never totally destroy “nature”. We can damage it until we “create” harsh conditions and destroy our own ability to survive. Such a conceptualization is provided (among others) by the Reformational tradition which recognizes the parallel between nature and culture in terms of a theory of irreducible modalities. “Nature” is supposed to express itself in a wide range of modalities, which includes being social, moral, aesthetic, and also having the physical traits usually associated with “nature”. All of these are susceptible for cultivation, in line with the laws and norms which are applicable to all the modes of being, in their coherence. “Stewardship” for the world in this context will mean to take a caring responsibility which does not only take into account the specific norms of one’s focus of cultivation, (for example “good for more profit”), but also for example the aesthetic, social and safety norms. If both “nature” and “culture” exist in all modalities simultaneously, “culture” cannot simply be scientificated unless subject functions are violated. This, more holistic Reformational approach, with both “nature” and “culture” existing simultaneously in the full spectrum of modalities in reality, is therefore proposed to alleviate the dualistic tension and improve sustainability.

Evert-Jan Ouweneel

Comprehension is no guarantee for action; we can know why we should and still not know why we would. Western ethics seems to have much to say about the should-part, but little about the would-part. Many books explain in extensive ways why the good is good and the bad is bad; they appeal to reason, and it seems quite reasonable to follow reason. But in practice all these wisdoms hardly seem to trigger the will. A deeper level of unwillingness remains untouched and says: Why would I? Why bother? In this workshop we will search for an adequate response to this deeper unwillingness. What triggers the will really? The answer suggested in this workshop will be derived from Plato and Genesis. We will leave the Augustinian will and return to the Platonic and Biblical concept of moral life as a battle between our physical and spiritual will and - within the spiritual will - between what is truly honourable and what is only seemingly honourable. In other words, in this workshop we will leave the concept of ´one will chosing between two minds´ and focus on the concept of ´one mind choosing between two wills´. This might give us a more adequate insight in the deeper drives of the human soul. The battle between our physical and spiritual will is in Plato´s Republic the battle between our desires (epithumia) on the one hand and our reason (logos) and spiritual fire (thumos) on the other. Plato makes it clear that only reason can truly know what is worth striving for in life. Alone, however, it cannot subject the desires to a higher, more spiritual, mission. Only the thumos has the power to withstand the epithumia. The battle of inner life is a clash of these two forces. Every clash, however, is caused by reason, for our spiritual fire can only follow the perceptions of the spirit. Without the spirit there will be no spiritual fire, only physical fire. In Plato´s Phaedrus the battle between the epithumia and the thumos is described as the battle between a pair of two winged horses led by a charioteer (logos). The thumotic horse “is noble and of noble breed, the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed”. Why is the first horse noble? Because he is “a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory”. This love for honour and glory, for timê and doxa, seems the thumotic trigger of the spiritual will in Plato´s view. He may be quite right! Perhaps, our spiritual will - i.e. the will involved in ethics - is not triggered by comprehension, but by the perception of timê and doxa, of what is honourable, dignified, glorious. Perhaps, it is our thumotic love for what is valuable that causes deference and reverence and gives us sufficient driving force to subject the epithumia to the appropriate way of dealing with the glorious. Crucial, however, is the veracity of what we perceive. For the noble horse only follows the charioteer. If the last is mistaken, mislead or seduced by the epithumia, so is the first. Now, there are some striking similarities between the Biblical meaning of the Hebrew word neshamah and Plato´s use of the word thumos in his Republic. Several times in the Old Testament we read about “the blast [neshamah] of the breath [ruach] of God´s nostrils” (Ps 18:15; 2Sa 22:16). The difference between the breath and its blast is the difference between the substance and the power that comes along with it. In the Bible the ruach represents the vitalizing input of God in all living creatures. All creatures live by the breath (or spirit) they receive from God. Humans, however, also receive the blast of God´s breath (the power or fire of God´s spirit, in the New Testament called dunamis). In Genesis 2:7 the attention is put on the divine neshamah that is blown into the nostrils of man. What does this mean? Plato might have a part of the answer. The gift of neshamah to man might well mean a divine sensitivity and enthusiasm in man for what is spiritually perceived as honourable, dignified, glorious. It would certainly explain why we attach so much value to the notion of dignity, and why we are capable of withstanding our desires and become worshippers of both God and man. Perhaps, ethics is less about good versus evil and more about nobility versus ignobility. We might at least perceive it that way, in order to communicate with our will on a deeper level and on the right frequency.

Martin Rice

Ethical theory throughout the Twentieth Century, and earlier, has been built on a metaphysical foundation of either empiricism - derived from David Hume - or physicalism of the sort embraced by Gilbert Harman. This has led theoretical ethics down the path of relativism, amoralism, hedonistic utilitarianism and emotivism in an attempt to find a place for ethics in human life that is compatible with the aforementioned metaphysical foundations. All of these avenues have been utter disasters for ethics at all levels. One of the biggest philosophical frauds that we’ve inherited from these metaphysical positions is the “fact-value” distinction, relegating ethics to a non-factual twilight realm. Ethics at the applied or the normative level cannot be done unless proper notice is taken of its metaphysical underpinnings. Ethics at all levels at which it is done today presupposes a metaphysical position. I wish to argue that there is no need to be saddled with the failed metaphysics of either empiricism or physicalism. If we start over with the Christian metaphysics of Herman Dooyeweerd we undercut the basis upon which amoralism, relativism, and the various hedonisms have all been built. The fact-value distinction can be seen for the intellectual fraud that it is and we can argue that ethical properties are a normal and non-mysterious part of the every day world. As a result, I argue that ethical properties are directly perceived by us and that no special and mysterious moral faculty of the mind is needed to perceive them as implied in the philosophy of G.E. Moore and others. This solves one of the great problems of current and past ethical theories, namely, how can we ever come to know moral properties as a part of the created world in a way that does not make them mere human inventions and conventions. It also resolves the dilemma of the fact-value distinction. My workshop presentation will argue for these ends.

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