Summary
Ruud Welten © 2001
Phenomenology and the Prohibition of Images
in Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion
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The present thesis offers a phenomenological interpretation of the religious prohibition of images based on the philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion. The writings of Levinas and Marion are studied in relation to Descartes and Husserl. The thesis is divided into four parts:
(1) general introduction;
(2) an analysis of Levinas;
(Intermezzo;)
(3) an analysis of Marion;
(4) concluding remarks (‘proposals’).
(1) Introduction
From a phenomenological point a view, the question regarding the meaning of the prohibition of images is formulated as follows: How can God be considered without reducing him to an image or a philosophical concept? The use of the expression ‘prohibition of images’ is not to be understood in a theological sense but, rather, in a metaphorical sense: it will be used to indicate the inner notion of the mind’s refusal to make an image of God. The phenomenological method is introduced based on points of agreement and difference between Descartes and Husserl. I maintain the working hypothesis that both Levinas and Marion are thinking within the ‘magnetic field’ (characterised by attraction and expulsion) of philosophy in which Descartes and Husserl represent opposite ‘poles’. If the Cartesian and Husserlian notion of ‘epoché’ and the banishment of scientific prejudices are applied to the quest for God, a methodological atheism is inevitable. This methodological atheism is found in both Descartes and Husserl.
(2) Levinas
An interpretation of the prohibition of images from Levinas’s point of view is offered. The starting point is Levinas’s philosophy of time. In Husserlian phenomenology, time is thought within the scope of intentionality. Intentionality is understood as a way to achieve adequation. However, the Cartesian idea of the Infinite cannot be understood on the basis of intentionality and adequation. Levinas is aiming at a phenomenology that is not ruled by intentionality, but, on the contrary, by non-intentionality. Within Husserl’s phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, Levinas focuses on the notion of the original impression (Urimpression). According to Levinas, Husserl fails to see that this impression is not preserved by memory, but evaporates. Husserl’s philosophy is molded to the principle of synchronisation, whereas Levinas aims at a diachrony in which original otherness is not recaptured by memory. This implies, from a Levinasian point of view, that Husserl erroneously understands time as the recovering of transient impressions.
According to Jean Wahl’s interpretation, this notion of transience is at the heart of Cartesian philosophy. Bergson and Wahl philosophically explore the idea of the instant. These philosophers are aiming at a philosophy that does not recapture past impressions by images. Their view offers a possibility to reconsider the role of the image in a Cartesian context. Infinity, as presented in Descartes’ Meditations, now comes to the fore. The idea of Infinity is an idea that is pre-eminently ‘inadequate’ and opposed to the idea of adequation in classical metaphysics. I argue for the thesis that the idea of Infinity is of phenomenological relevance because it is an idea within consciousness. However, this also implies that the idea of the Infinite is in danger of becoming a fixed image because it remains an object of thought. Levinas’s readings of Malebranche offer a defence against such an implication: the idea of Infinity, according to Malebranche, ceases to be an object of thought.
I conclude this part by focussing attention on the idea of ‘passing away’, as found in Exodus 33. The passage in which this idea is found is understood in terms of temporality as explored in the preceding paragraphs. The notion of the ‘trace’ as ‘passing away’ is studied. I argue that this notion of the trace/of passing away effaces itself. Because there are no remaining traces of Infinity, the only true ‘image’ of Infinity is its passing away. In terms of Levinas’s correction of the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, this passing away or absence is thought as oblivion. A way to understand the prohibition of images from this point of view is presented on the basis of a reading of Jean-Louis Chrétien: where the trace leads to total oblivion, which is understood as the forgetting of the forgetting, the prohibition demands that we do not forget the oblivion of the veritable non-image of God. This view demands a way of thinking that is called, after Bergson, ‘fluid thinking’. Fluid thinking entails accepting the flowing of time without recovering the original ‘passing away’ through images.
Intermezzo
Focussing on Marion’s readings of Levinas, I argue that Levinas has always remained a phenomenologist: non-intentionality cannot be understood outside phenomenology itself. Levinas pretends to get rid of ontology in a way similar to Heidegger: Marion shows how Levinas’s notion of ‘appeal’ is close to Heidegger’s notion of ‘Anspruch’. Both notions are non-ontological in their intermediary function. For this reason, Levinas’s disengagement from Husserl and Heidegger is not convincing. Marion also analyses Levinas’s notion of the face or countenance. Because every appeal demands an answer, the face cannot be previous to the I, as Levinas suggests. As a result, Levinas’s so-called conversion from phenomenology to ethics as first philosophy is called into question.
(3) Marion
In the first section of this part, the antagonism between the idol and the icon, as elaborated in Marion’s God without Being, is examined. The idol fixes the gaze, whereas the icon is experienced without subjective fixation. The idol is analysed, in Husserlian language, as a type of intentional fulfillment. Before exploring the notion of the icon as a ‘perfect inversion’ of the intentionality of the idol, the question of visibility and invisibility in relation to art and visual culture is studied. This is studied in relation to a phenomenological interpretation of the ‘norm’ for the icon as given in Colossians 1:15 wherein Christ is described as ‘the image of the invisible God’. The philosophy of Michel Henry offers a framework for considering invisibility phenomenologically. The quest for religious art is elaborated through a comparison of Marion and Henry. Marion’s thinking on invisibility, which is based on the formula given in Colossians, has consequences for his view of the world and its visibility. This view is compared to Heidegger’s thoughts on ‘worldview’ (Weltbild).
The second section of this part will examine Marion’s readings of Descartes on the theme of idolatry and will focus on a critcism of what Heidegger has called ontotheology. Whereas Heidegger maintains the use of this expression in the name of philosophy, Marion uses this expression in the name of theology. This suggests that Marion wants to think God without ontological determinations. In spite of Heidegger’s refusals to accept Descartes’ ontotheological tendencies, Marion examines Descartes’ status as a so-called ‘ontotheological’ philosopher. Heidegger’s criticisms also shows his efforts to break away from Husserl. Heidegger states that the Cartesian cogito conceals ontology. Marion investigates this statement and concludes that Heidegger cannot understand the Cartesian ego from the point of view of the ‘being there’ (Dasein). To do so leads to an erroneous interpretation of the Cartesian constitution of the consciousness of God. Heidegger, according to Marion, has failed to see the role of the idea of Infinity.
Two examples of Marion’s re-readings of Descartes are presented. The first unveils the original alterity within the ego. Based on reciprocal formulations in Descartes’ Meditations, Marion offers an interpretation that traverses every traditional interpretation of Descartes. The second example studies Henry’s claim that Descartes’ ego can only be thought as a pure self-affection. In this interpretation, Marion recognises the necessity of non-intentionality and pure givenness (donation).
Givenness is the main theme of Marion’s book Étant donné. Marion’s phenomenological correction on givenness is elaborated in two stages: first, in Reduction and Givenness, he states that there is as much givenness as there is reduction. Second, in Étant donné, the phenomenological reduction is executed on the concept of givenness itself: givenness is no longer thought within the bounds of causality or transcendent constitution. Marion aims at an immanent conception of givenness in which subjectivity is thought through the idea of anamorphosis. Givenness is always contingent and incidental.
The final section on Marion deals with the ‘saturated phenomenon’. This is a correction of Husserl’s thought on the fulfillment of intentionality in which a lack is presupposed in order to fulfil a need. As opposed to the lack of intentionality, the saturated phenomenon is a phenomenon that is characterised by abundance. Marion describes this abundance on the basis of the crossing of the borders of Kant’s groups of categories. Marion meets the utmost possibility of the saturated phenomenon in the phenomenon of Christ.
(4) Proposals
In the first section of my concluding remarks entitled, ‘Figurations’, three types of so-called ‘theo-phenomenology’ are described. The phenomenon of God can be a particular, general, or singular phenomenon. The thesis is presented that all of the phenomenological models that Marion offers are ‘particular’: the phenomenon of God or Christ is not like the phenomena of the world. Levinas maintains a type of phenomenology wherein God cannot be pictured. His phenomenological model is called singular. In a section entitled ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi), I also consider the question of whether Marion’s division between theology and phenomenology leads to an impure theology and an impure phenomenology. In the second section entitled, ‘Defigurations’, the idea of ‘fluid thinking’ is elaborated upon and the question is asked to what extent Descartes and Husserl can be understood as ‘fluid thinkers’. In the final section entitled, ‘Chiasms’, some figures of ‘crossing’, as ways of prohibitions of images, are presented.